On Kalam

This is copied from a post I made on a message board regarding the Kalam Cosmological Argument. It's by no means definitive on my part, or even roughly edited, but it's a sound enough representation of what's been floating around in my head to put it up here.

Enjoy, if you can read it while still in its messy state. If so, all critiques welcome. ;)

Kalam goes like this:

1) Everything that begins to exist has a cause; **
2) The universe began to exist;
3) Therefore, the universe has a cause.
** - "begins to exist" def:= "x exists at t; there is no time immediately prior to t at which x exists; and the actual world contains no state of affairs involving x's timeless existence." Craig, "Must the Beginning of the Universe Have a Personal Cause? A Rejoinder," http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcrai ... iston.html definition A4.

This is a valid argument, i.e. if the premises (1) and (2) are established properly then (3) follows by deduction.

Premise (1) is an intuitive notion, argues the Theist. We don't observe things like tigers popping in our living room uncaused, for instance; nor do randomly appearing particles themselves have no cause - they are caused by antecedent quantum-mechanical states. Even the arch-skeptic David Hume did not believe that objects or events could happen without any cause whatsoever.

Premise (2) is established, the Theist would claim, by the finiteness of the Universe. Since the Universe has a particular age, and is not infinite temporally as was once supposed by philosophers (including, at times, Aquinas himself!) and by physicists (such as the proponents of the Steady-State model that failed in answer to the Big Bang) then the universe began to exist. Recent models of an infinitely oscillating universe fail due to the finiteness of entropy; furthermore (and this includes "multiverse" theorems and Brane cosmology) astrophysicist Alexander Vilenkin has mathematically proven that any model of the universe(s) must itself have a beginning in time.

Therefore, the conclusion (3) is established. Proponents of this argument, called the Kalam Cosmological Argument, argue that the cause must be personal; for, if it were an impersonal cause, it would have insufficient means to cause the Universe from a changeless state; therefore, this changeless state must include a freely-willed decision by an infinite Being to actually create. Craig in Reasonable Faith makes the case that this is so.

I have formulated two counterarguments, in brief:

(1) If motion is continuous (i.e., if time units shorter than the Plank Time can be experienced) then the Second Law of Thermodynamics dictates a tendency to infinite heat - and zero entropy - as we reverse the arrow of time. This implies that causal action relatively increased without bound with respect to the temporal distance between any particular action in a causal chain as we approach the Big Bang. Therefore, the Cosmic Singularity is a limit point, which did not actually exist, and the universe has always existed causally while itself existing temporally with respect to any constantly measured time-unit. The mathematics, which relies only on Calculus II procedures, demonstrates this, but I won't present the details here. This eradicates the need for a First Cause, and therefore a Creator, and represents a positive-atheistic argument against God.

(2) If motion is not continuous (a Unified Theory on Quantum Gravity may establish this) then the first state of the Universe was the Cosmic Singularity and the second state was the early condition at Plank Time following the "Bang." This would render the Kalam Cosmological Argument true, as the universe necessarily would contain finite causal chains by rule of physics.

However, in this case, science has shown (in a paper whose link I've lost) that the Big Bang singularity would be an actual existential state. In other words, all components of existence would have originated from a state where each component was superimposed upon one another - there existed no space (i.e. distance between these components), no motion, and so on.

But this implies that the Cosmic Singularity exists outside of time. As Einstein stated, time is relative. Relative to what? The placement and motion of separate objects! Therefore, the Initial Cosmic Singularity is literally eternal - it is not some pellet that sat there in "infinite space" for "forever" - both which imply a distance between objects and ongoing metaphysical motion, which both did not exist in this primary state of the universe - but it is literally outside of any concept of time whatsoever, since, once again, there was no motion and no distance between the primary building blocks of existence. Space was wrapped to zero (distance) and was "infinitely dense" by implication. We cannot imagine a timeless state - do NOT think of it as an "infinitely long" state! - but we can imagine the causal connection of the primary constituents of the universe: let {B} be the metaphysical set of primary constituents, which must be finite in number (by physics). Number them b1, b2, b3, ..., bn.

Each element b in {B} has its own particular identity. Among these elements were the indestructible building blocks of matter as we know it today - quanta that, as physics proves, cannot exist in the same space with the same quantum state for any period of time. In other words, matter can't occupy the same space. In other words, we have the following simultaneous causal chain in the (timeless!) state of the Big Bang Singularity for one particular element of {B} that is of this particular quanta, say, "b": since no space separates b from all other elements of {B}, it must affect the subset {B'} of likewise quanta that cannot be in the same place. Since no distance initially separates these elements, b will affect all other elements of {B'} (and likewise each other element effects b}, prompting motion, in accordance with the laws of Quantum Mechanics for these particles. As an easy illustration, imagine that there are only four such particles (there are in fact a tremendous, but ultimately finite, number of such particles):

--------b2
--------^
--------|
--------v
b1< --> b <--> b3
--------^
--------|
--------v
--------b4

Each arrow represents a necessary causation of one upon the other. Note the arrows go both ways. Not included here is the vast graph network that will result, for, b2 must also connect with b3 and b4 in the same manner, etc. Can you imagine such a causal network for an exponentially tremendous amount of these objects!?

Bang. As Quantum Mechanics dictates for {B'}, the vast, massive heat-releasing, rapid motion of these particles results from this vast networked chain of causation. From motion, we have that space and time unfurls. It is such a magnificent effect that the universe begins to expand so rapidly that modern physics can't comprehend it yet!

Therefore, we have that the Big Bang Singularity brought the motion-rich (and therefore time-rich), space-relationed Universe into existence from its "former" nontemporal, nonspacial state. The cause of the elements of {B'} upon each other lead to these present facts, and the initial state of causation at the Singularity wasn't "just like that 'unchanged' forever;" it had no motion, no referent, and therefore no time; no "forever" in the loose sense. It existed eternally - in the sense that it existed externally out of time. The causation of {B'} upon itself wasn't like that "forever," it simply was.

Therefore either presentation resultant from Quantum Gravity leads to a notion of the nonexistence of the Creator, as my case (1) demonstrates the necessity of an infinite causal chain described by "unboundedly faster" causation given Quantum Gravity's dictation of continuous motion, or, if not, my case (2) explains the necessary cause of the Universe from an atemporal, nonintelligent state.

The nature of the Trinity and of Mary

I was watching a Catholic show on early heresies last night, led by a theologian whose name I can't recall. The host dealt pretty harshly with heresies specific to the nature of Christ, and it drummed up some thoughts about when I was a believer - I didn't really understand what the Incarnation actually means.

Unfortunately, the only noted heresy I recall by name is "Arianism," due to its similarity (only by the sound of the word) to the racial policies picked up by the Nazis. The concept, banned as heresy by the First Council of Nicea, taught that God created Christ at the moment of His birth, if I recall correctly.

The Catholic theologian went on to explain that God is one essence and three persons - all of equivalent natures, not just similar ones. How can this be so? It is not entirely clear to me, especially in light of John 14:28, how they can be considered equivalent, but maybe I'm missing something here.

I simply can't understand what the doctrine of the Trinity means. When I was a believer, I thought of it as a corporation, the "God corporation," in which three separate Beings filled the necessary roles to comprise a coherent notion of God. Are these three Beings separate, or not? Are they equal, or not, or would the term "equal" be used in different senses here?

One last point, especially considering any believing audience of mine is a Protestant one: if Christ is equivalent to God, this makes Mary the literal mother of God. It seems she's due the veneration (but not the worship) that Catholics give - I actually agreed with the show's host on this point. When did such veneration fall away in Protestant thinking, and why?

Just some thoughts - looking forward to your responses!

-Darrin

The Nature of God and the Kalam Cosmological Argument

The Kalam Cosmological Argument for the Existence of God typically goes:

1) Everything that begins to exist has a cause;
2) The universe began to exist;
3) Therefore, the universe has a cause.

This has recently been revived by Dr. William Lane Craig, a believing scholar who I am proud to call a friend despite our enormous disagreements (1).

The argument has attracted sharp attention from the nontheist crowd, specifically since Bill has both defined all his terms in the argument clearly and has adjusted his argument effectively for past criticisms. Former believers Dan Barker and my friend John Loftus and philosophy professors Quentin Smith and Ray Bradley are just a few skeptics who have offered recent refutations for this argument (2).

One of the most peculiar aspects of the argument is the nature of God that is implied from the argument itself (if one grants that the argument proves that the "First Cause" is nonpersonal, a granting which I don't freely give away even if I concede for sake of argument that Kalam is valid!). As I discovered from a discussion on Kalam earlier tonight, the three possible views of God are:

(1) Timeless and eternal.
(2) Always temporal.
(3) Timeless sans Creation and cotemporal with Creation.

Position 3 is advocated by Bill Craig (3), but I have run across a few who do not agree. However, I see problems inherent in the other two possibilities - if God were timeless and eternal, how would He be omniscient? He would know, for instance, that "on September 11, 2001, terrorists attack the World Trade Center in New York City," but He would *NOT* know any current state of being, i.e. "it is 7:22 AM."

God would see all actualities at once, not just all potentialities as in Bill Craig's position. Both versions of God would "see" all existence at once, kind of the same way we see the Mona Lisa all at once. However, God #3 would become temporal at the time of Creation, thus enabling Him to sit back and actually watch as the Mona Lisa is in fact painted, enjoying the full set of omniscience that it grants. In a timeless state sans Creation, He would not need to know all the tensed truths of Creation since Creation is not alongside Him in the timeless state.

Given that He created, though, His Omniscience would demand that He come into time since the Universe would be in an actual progressive temporal state, meaning He must realize this state fully to maintain Omniscience. Furthermore, from His morning strolls in the Garden of Eden to His conversations with Job and Isaiah, it is clear the Bible states God interacted with the world temporally. To me, then, a God who is "always timeless" is not only not omniscient, but he can't be the God of the Bible, either.

The other option - the eternally temporal God - seems silly on its face. After all, God would have literally taken forever to create the Universe. He must have been quite bored.

Craig's option has deeper issues, which I will think out more clearly in a later post, but the top problem that pops to mind is that a timeless God by definition can't "choose" anything. If the "choice" existed outside of time as part of God's Knowledge (perhaps the lowest twig on the whole tree, or the last step in logical priority?), then how does that choice enable God to make a universe with a beginning in time?

The aforementioned upcoming post will also present my objections to Kalam qua Kalam, but for now I will stop here. For these first few posts, I will moderate the comments for a bitsy, to make sure none of the recent DC problems with vulgar comments don't wander their way here, but in a while I'll keep the area as open for discussion as possible (hoping there will be some hanging around who think I'm worthy enough to discuss!).

-Darrin

(1) Craig, Reasonable Faith 3rd Edition, 2008 Crossway Publishing.
(2) See e.g. Dan Barker's Godless and John W. Loftus' Why I Became an Atheist (Prometheus Books), Quentin Smith's many debates and discussions with Bill Craig on the subject of Kalam, and Ray Bradley's excellent paper here: http://www.eequalsmcsquared.auckland.ac.nz/sites/emc2/tl/philosophy/articles/does-the-creator-have-a-creator.cfm
(3) Craig, Time and Eternity, 2001 Crossway Publishing.